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GAINSHARING AND THE PATIENT PROTECTION AND 
AFFORDABLE CARE ACT 
Nicole Martingano-Reinhart* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
“Gainsharing” is a business practice that can reduce costs and 
increase efficiency while engaging and rewarding front-line workers, 
those who work most directly with customers or with the product a 
company manufactures.1  Although the practice reportedly began as 
early as the nineteenth century,2 it became popular in the 1930s in 
the steel manufacturing industry.3  While several different forms of 
performance incentives fall under the category of gainsharing, in the 
typical gainsharing arrangement employees suggest cost-saving 
improvements to processes and the selection of materials.4  They 
receive a previously agreed upon portion of the savings associated 
with the improvements as compensation.5 
Hospitals and healthcare systems have attempted to introduce 
gainsharing programs in healthcare settings in order to help reduce 
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Pasquale for his guidance throughout the comment writing process and Michael 
Kalison, Esq. for his insights on the Medicare Physician-Hospital Collaboration 
Demonstration and the practical aspects of gainsharing programs.  
 1  See V. Michel Magliore Marcoux, Why Healthcare Fraud and Abuse Laws Should 
Allow Appropriate Hospital Gainsharing, 59 ALA. L. REV. 539, 542 (2008). 
 2  Theresa M. Welbourne & Luis R. Gomez Mejia, Gainsharing: A Critical Review 
and a Future Research Agenda 3 (Ctr. for Advanced Human Res. Studies, Working 
Paper No. 95-10, 1995), available at http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu
/cgi /viewcontent.cgi?article=1199&context=cahrswp&sei-redir
=1&referer=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.google.com%2Furl%3Fsa%3Dt%26source%3Dwe
b%26cd%3D4%26sqi%3D2%26ved%3D0CDQQFjAD%26url%3Dhttp%253A%252F
%252Fdigitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu%252Fcgi%252Fviewcontent.cgi%253Farticle%
253D1199%2526context%253Dcahrswp%26rct%3Dj%26q%3Dhistory%2520of%252
0gainsharing%26ei%3DNhqeTruSFsWw8QPEqNGKCQ%26usg%3DAFQjCNEykAM
n_1_ZyRYt84sMNN308_mTNw%26sig2%3D3jXbaBIq6Muypog1GOmv1A#search=%
22history%20gainsharing%22. 
 3  Richard S. Saver, Squandering the Gain: Gainsharing and the Continuing Dilemma 
of Physician Financial Incentives, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 145, 148 (2003).   
 4  See Marcoux, supra note 1, at 542. 
 5  See id. 
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the increasing costs of healthcare.6  Unfortunately, gainsharing 
programs are likely to violate the federal Anti-Kickback Statute 
(AKS), the Stark Law, and the Civil Monetary Penalties Statute (CMP 
Statute).7  Gainsharing programs may also preclude hospitals from 
tax-exempt status.8  Consequently, gainsharing has been limited to a 
few Medicare demonstration programs, limited programs intended to 
provide data on whether to permit gainsharing on a more widespread 
basis.  The statutes that provide for these demonstration programs 
allow for waivers or exemptions of the AKS, Stark Law, and CMP 
Statute for hospitals participating in the demonstration programs.9 
On March 23, 2010, Congress enacted the Patient Protection 
and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) for the purpose of expanding 
health insurance coverage and reducing the cost of healthcare.10  
Because gainsharing is one potential method of reducing costs while 
maintaining or improving performance, this Comment will analyze 
whether PPACA adequately removes the legal barriers associated with 
gainsharing. 
Part II of this Comment discusses the history of gainsharing 
practices and attempts to institute gainsharing in healthcare settings.  
It also identifies potential risks for Congress to consider when 
enacting statutory safe harbors or amending the applicable laws to 
encourage the creation of gainsharing programs.  Part III discusses 
the statutory barriers to establishing gainsharing programs in 
hospitals and pre-PPACA efforts to eliminate those barriers.  Part IV 
of this Comment discusses provisions in PPACA that may help resolve 
the legal problems associated with gainsharing.  It then analyzes the 
likelihood that these provisions will encourage successful gainsharing 
programs.  Part IV also argues that the solutions adopted in PPACA 
 
 6  See, e.g., Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, § 5007(c)(1), 120 
Stat. 4 (2006); Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 
2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173, § 646, 117 Stat. 2066 (2003). 
 7 Anne B. Claiborne et al., Legal Impediments to Implementing Value-Based 
Purchasing in Healthcare, 35 AM. J.L. & MED. 442, 486–89 (2009); see 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-
7b (2006) (the AKS); 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(a)(1) (Stark); id. § 1320a-7a (the CMP 
Statute). 
 8  Gail P. Heagan & Ivan Wood, Gainsharing: Aligning Incentives of Hospitals and 
Physicians, AHLA Seminar Materials P02109911 (1999); see Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-
1(c)(2). 
 9  See, e.g., § 5007(c)(1); § 646. 
 10  See, e.g., The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 
§ 2718 (2010) (entitled “Bringing down the cost of health care coverage”); The 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 2702 (2010) 
(entitled “Guaranteed availability of coverage”). 
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are not sufficient to overcome the legal hurdles that currently 
prevent the institution of gainsharing programs.  Part V of this 
Comment recommends amendments to the law that will better 
address these issues.  The recommended amendments include 
statutory safe harbors for qualifying gainsharing programs, so that the 
health care system will enjoy the benefits of gainsharing while the law 
protects against potential drawbacks.  Part VI concludes. 
II. GAINSHARING: HISTORY AND BARRIERS TO ITS APPLICATION IN THE 
HEALTHCARE INDUSTRY 
A.  History of Gainsharing and Its Introduction into the Healthcare 
Setting 
Gainsharing was mainly first applied in the context of 
manufacturing.11  One of the first gainsharing programs is attributed 
to Joseph Scanlon, who established a gainsharing program in the 
1930s to prevent the demise of a troubled company.12  This 
gainsharing model, now known as the “Scanlon Plan,” is very similar 
to that described supra in Section I.  Employees were asked to provide 
suggestions for improving productivity.13  Then a “screening 
committee” composed of higher-level employees selected the most 
promising suggestions, oversaw their implementation, and evaluated 
their effectiveness.14  In addition to simply reducing costs, the success 
of the plan was attributed to “employee involvement, bonus payment, 
and identity with the firm.”15  The program enabled workers to 
provide insights on the production process and thus encouraged 
collaboration and teamwork.16  Because gainsharing ties rewards to 
processes and circumstances directly under the workers’ control—in 
contrast to profit sharing in which the reward may be tied to external 
circumstances—some commentators have argued that gainsharing 
programs increase employee loyalty.17  Additionally, front-line workers 
have access to more information about day-to-day operations than 
managers because front-line workers conduct these operations, so 
 
 11  Saver, supra note 3, at 186–87. 
 12  U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, AFMD-81-22, PRODUCTIVITY SHARING 
PROGRAMS: CAN THEY CONTRIBUTE TO PRODUCTIVITY IMPROVEMENT? 7 (1981), available 
at http://www.gao.gov/assets/80/79298.pdf.   
 13  Id. at 8.   
 14  Id. 
 15  Id.  
 16  Saver, supra note 3, at 188. 
 17  Id. at 189. 
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they are likely to be able to provide novel insights on how to save 
money.18 
Several factors have influenced the success of gainsharing 
initiatives in industries other than healthcare.  For example, 
companies that did not establish a culture of “worker participation” 
or that did not invest the necessary time and up-front costs have not 
been successful in establishing gainsharing programs.19  In a 1999 
study, researchers examined the likelihood of survival of 211 
gainsharing programs.20  Dong-One Kim, a professor of Industrial 
Relations and Human Resource Management at Korea University 
Business School, found that the programs most likely to survive were 
those that: employees had approved with a vote; included re-training 
of employees and training of new employees; involved “small bonus 
groups” under 100 employees; were instituted in a “labor-intensive 
organization[]” and in a financially healthy organization; and 
involved a “major capital investment.”21  He also found an indirect 
effect related to the positive performance of the program.22  
Unsurprisingly, the programs that were most successful in saving costs 
and compensating employees were most likely to survive.23 
Although healthcare may not be considered “labor-intensive,” 
the other factors that Kim identified can apply to gainsharing 
programs in the healthcare industry.  Those instituting gainsharing in 
a healthcare setting can encourage the program’s success by having 
physicians vote on the program, ensuring proper training, and 
limiting the bonus groups to fewer than 100 physicians.  Additionally, 
one must consider the financial health of the entity and the financial 
assets available when establishing a gainsharing program. 
Healthcare providers can adopt practices from the 
manufacturing setting—such as gainsharing—to improve efficiency 
of healthcare delivery without sacrificing quality of care.  Shouldice 
Hernia Hospital in Toronto, Canada is a well-known example of this 
principle.  Shouldice applies strategies from manufacturing such as 
specialization through limiting its area of practice to only one 
medical condition, quality control through peer supervision, and 
 
 18  Id. at 186–87. 
 19  Id. at 198. 
 20  Dong-One Kim, Determinants of the Survival of Gainsharing Programs, 53 INDUS. & 
LAB. REL. REV. 21, 21 (1999). 
 21  Id. at 34–36. 
 22  Id. at 37. 
 23  Id.  
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standardization of surgical procedures.24  Shouldice’s success and 
lowered costs are also attributable to the fact that Shouldice does not 
operate on high-risk patients, such as those who are overweight or 
have other medical conditions.25  But Shouldice’s success illustrates 
that manufacturing principles are applicable to healthcare to reduce 
costs without compromising patient outcomes.26 
Legal barriers have curtailed the establishment of gainsharing 
arrangements in the healthcare industry.27  In 1999, the Office of 
Inspector General (OIG) of the U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services (HHS), published an advisory bulletin stating that 
gainsharing arrangements were in direct violation of the federal CMP 
Statute.28  The OIG noted that “it would ‘take into consideration in 
exercising its enforcement discretion whether a gainsharing 
arrangement was terminated expeditiously,’”29 suggesting that active 
gainsharing arrangements should be shut down quickly in order to 
avoid penalties. 
In 2001, the outlook for gainsharing in healthcare became more 
favorable—the OIG provided an advisory opinion indicating that it 
would not impose penalties on a group of cardiologists who had 
 
 24  Peter Behr, Rx for the Economy?, WASH. POST, Apr. 10, 1986, at E1. 
 25  Id.  
 26  For example, a 2006 article reported that Shouldice’s cost for disposable 
surgical items was less than $20 per surgery, compared to $200 to $800 per surgery at 
other hospitals.  Sharda Prashad, A Cut Above the Rest, TORONTO STAR, Jan. 22, 2006, 
at A19.  The article also reported that Shouldice’s complication and infection rate 
was under 0.5%.  Id.  
 27  Mary Ellen Schneider, Legal Concerns Hinder Adoption of Gainsharing, INTERNAL 
MEDICINE NEWS, May 1, 2007, at 50. 
 28  OIG Special Advisory Bulletin: Gainsharing Arrangements and CMPs for 
Hospital Payments to Physicians to Reduce or Limit Services to Beneficiaries (July 
1999), http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs/alertsandbulletins/gainsh.htm [hereinafter 
OIG Special Advisory Bulletin].  The OIG Special Advisory Bulletin stated that:  
While the OIG recognizes that appropriately structured gainsharing 
arrangements may offer significant benefits where there is no adverse 
impact on the quality of care received by patients, section 1128A(b)(1) 
of the [Social Security] Act [which sets forth the CMP law] clearly 
prohibits such arrangements.  Moreover, regulatory relief from the 
CMP prohibition will require statutory authorization.  
Id.; see also D. McCarty Thorton et al., Gainsharing: Regulatory Breakthrough, but 
Challenges Remain, HEALTH CARE FRAUD REPORT (Bureau of Nat’l Affairs, D.C.), 2005 
at 3–4, available at http://www.hortyspringer.com/ACPE
/HealthCareFraudReport.pdf.  The CMP Statute prohibits hospitals from paying 
doctors for “reduc[ing] or limit[ing] services to Medicare and Medicaid 
beneficiaries.”  OIG Special Advisory Bulletin.  Both the hospitals and the doctors 
can be liable for penalties of up to $2000 per patient.  See id.  
 29  Thorton et al., supra note 27, at 3 (quoting OIG Special Advisory Bulletin).   
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established a gainsharing program.30  This opinion created renewed 
optimism that gainsharing programs would be permitted in the 
future.31  But the OIG identified a number of specific factors that led 
to this decision.32  The factors included: identifying cost-saving 
initiatives at the outset of the project,33 which the OIC believed would 
promote “transparency”; establishing a plan for monitoring quality of 
patient care; setting thresholds for physician reimbursement; and 
disclosing to patients that the cardiologists had instituted a 
gainsharing program.34  Some of these factors have since been used 
for guidance in establishing gainsharing demonstrations and 
proposing statutory exceptions to laws that would prevent 
gainsharing.35  Richard Saver, a leading scholar in the field of health 
law, however, noted that many of the other factors that were 
important to the OIG in making its decision would be extremely 
 
 30  Id. at 3–4; see Re: OIG Advisory Opinion No. 01, 2001 WL 36190940, 14 
(HHSOIG Jan. 11, 2001). 
 31  Thorton et al., supra note 27, at 3–4..  
 32  Re: OIG Advisory Opinion No. 01, 2001 WL 36190940, 8–10 (HHSOIG Jan. 
11, 2001).  In a more recent opinion, the OIG noted that it was still concerned about 
possible risks of gainsharing, including:  
(i) stinting on patient care, (ii) cherry-picking healthy patients and 
steering sicker (and more costly) patients to hospitals that do not offer 
gainsharing opportunities, (iii) payments in return for patient 
referrals, and (iv) unfair competition (as hospitals race to offer more 
and better gainsharing programs to foster physician loyalty and attract 
referrals).  
2009 Health L. Handbook § 8:46 (citation omitted).  These concerns are discussed 
infra Part II.D. 
 33  The initiatives included nineteen measures for reducing costs, “fourteen 
recommendations that involve opening packaged items only as needed during a 
procedure.”  Re: OIG Advisory Opinion No. 01, 2001 WL 36190940 (HHSOIG Jan. 
11, 2001).  Four of the initiatives involved using less expensive products.  Id.  One 
initiative involved limiting the “use of Aprotinin—a medication currently given to 
many surgical patients pre-operatively to prevent hemorrhaging—to patients that are 
at higher risk of perioperative hemorrhage as indicated by objective clinical 
standards.”  Id. 
 34  Saver, supra note 3, at 168.   
 35  See Medicare Gainsharing Demonstration: Report to Congress on Quality Improvement 
and Savings, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., available at 
https://www.cms.gov/reports/downloads/Buczko_Gain_Sharing_Final_Report_May
_2011.pdf (2011) at 2, 10 (discussing quality of care data and caps on payments to 
physicians at two gainsharing demonstration sites); Wilson Hayman, Is Gainsharing 
Finally Here to Stay? Recent Advisory Opinions and Proposed Stark Exception Appear to Pave 
the Way, THE NAT’L L. REV. 4 (2009), available at http://www.natlawreview.com
/article/gainsharing-finally-here-to-stay-recent-advisory-opinions-and-propo 
(discussing a proposed exception to Stark). 
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difficult to replicate.36  For example, the doctors involved were all 
part of “the same legally organized medical group,” and the cost-
saving measures were already defined and supported in the 
literature.37 
The federal government has sought to examine the feasibility 
and effectiveness of gainsharing programs through several 
demonstration programs.38  Section 646 of the Medicare 
Modernization Act (MMA), which was enacted in 2003, called for 
gainsharing demonstration programs in up to seventy-two hospitals as 
part of the Physician-Hospital Collaboration Demonstration 
(PHCD).39  The MMA provided for a waiver of the CMP Statute for 
participating hospitals.40  Indiana Health Information Exchange 
(IHIE) and North Carolina Community Care Networks instituted 
programs.  But the programs focused on pay-for-performance 
 
 36  Saver, supra note 3, at 170. 
 37  Id. at 170. 
 38  Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-71, § 5007(c)(1), 120 Stat. 4 
(2006); Medicare Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 108-173, § 646, 117 Stat. 2066 
(2003). 
 39  Medicare Health Care Quality Demonstration Programs Fact Sheet, CTRS. FOR 
MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., http://www.cms.gov/DemoProjectsEvalRpts/
downloads/MMA646_FactSheet.pdf; Gainsharing Gets Boost Projects Still Lack Funding, 
MODERN PHYSICIAN, http://www.modernphysician.com/article/ 
20080609/MODERNPHYSICIAN/363294579 (June 9, 2008); Michael Romano, Gain-
sharing Demo a Go; CMS Details Physician-hospital Collaboration Project, MODERN 
PHYSICIAN (Oct. 1, 2006) at 5, available at http://go.galegroup.com.ezproxy.shu.edu
/ps/i.do?&id=GALE% 7CA154247530&v=2.1&u=setonhallu&it=r&p=HRCA&sw=w.  
According to the MMA:  
[T]he Secretary shall establish a 5-year demonstration program under 
which the Secretary shall approve demonstration projects that examine 
health delivery factors that encourage the delivery of improved quality 
in patient care, including— (1) the provision of incentives to improve 
the safety of care provided to beneficiaries; (2) the appropriate use of 
best practice guidelines by providers and services by beneficiaries; (3) 
reduced scientific uncertainty in the delivery of care through the 
examination of variations in the utilization and allocation of services, 
and outcomes measurement and research; (4) encourage shared 
decision making between providers and patients; (5) the provision of 
incentives for improving the quality and safety of care and achieving 
the efficient allocation of resources; (6) the appropriate use of 
culturally and ethnically sensitive health care delivery; and (7) the 
financial effects on the health care marketplace of altering the 
incentives for care delivery and changing the allocation of resources.   
42 U.S.C. § 1395cc-3 (2006). 
 40  § 1395cc-3. The MMA provides that “the Secretary may waive such 
requirements of titles XI and XVIII as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of 
the demonstration program established under this section.”  Id. 
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measures in general, rather than specifically on gainsharing.41  Under 
the PHCD, the New Jersey Hospital Association planned to establish 
gainsharing programs in eight of its hospitals.42  Although the 
hospitals received CMS approval to participate in the demonstration, 
they did not obtain OIG approval.43  Robert Wood Johnson University 
Hospital and St. Francis Medical Center, which were not participating 
in the program, sued HHS and CMS to enjoin the demonstration.44  
The U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey found that the 
demonstration project was a violation of the CMP Statute and, 
because the hospitals had not obtained OIG approval, granted the 
injunction.45 
The Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 (DRA) created a 
demonstration program specifically for gainsharing initiatives, which 
required CMS to establish gainsharing programs in up to six 
hospitals.46  The DRA provided a number of safe harbors for these 
pilot programs to ensure that they would not be in violation of 
sections 1128A, 1128B, and 1877 of the Social Security Act, which 
deal with physician inducement, remuneration, and financial 
relationships, respectively.47  In order to be chosen, applicants to the 
 
 41  Medicare Health Care Quality Demonstration Programs Fact Sheet, supra note 39. 
 42  Robert Wood Johnson Univ. Hosp., Inc. v. Thompson, No. Civ.A.04-142(JWB), 
2004 WL 3210732, at *1 (D.N.J. Apr. 15, 2004). 
 43  Id. at *11–12. 
 44  Id. at *1. 
 45  Id. at *13. 
 46  Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, § 5007(c)(1), 120 Stat. 4 
(2006); DRA 5007 Medicare Hospital Gainsharing Demonstration Solicitation, CTRS. FOR 
MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS,  https://www.cms.gov/ 
Medicare/DemonstrationProjects/DemoProjectsEvalRpts/downloads// 
DRA5007_Solicitation.pdf.  The DRA provided that:  
The Secretary shall establish under this section a qualified gainsharing 
demonstration program under which the Secretary shall approve 
demonstration projects by not later than November 1, 2006, to test and 
evaluate methodologies and arrangements between hospitals and 
physicians designed to govern the utilization of inpatient hospital 
resources and physician work to improve the quality and efficiency of 
care provided to Medicare beneficiaries and to develop improved 
operational and financial hospital performance with sharing of 
remuneration as specified in the project.  Such projects shall be 
operational by not later than January 1, 2007. 
Deficit Reduction Act, § 5007(a).  
 47  Deficit Reduction Act, § 5007(c)(1).  
An incentive payment made by a hospital to a physician under and in 
accordance with a demonstration project shall not constitute— (A) 
remuneration for purposes of section 1128B of the Social Security Act 
(42 U.S.C. 1320a–7b); (B) a payment intended to induce a physician to 
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program were required to have an organized and specific 
implementation plan and a method to carefully measure quality of 
care and efficiency.48  The demonstrations were also required to be 
budget neutral in order to ensure that gainsharing actually produced 
savings.49  CMS established a protocol for evaluating budget 
neutrality.50  Two medical centers participated: Beth Israel Medical 
Center in New York and Charleston Area Medical Center in West 
Virginia.51  The outcome of these programs is discussed in Part II.C 
infra. 
 
reduce or limit services to a patient entitled to benefits under Medicare 
or a State plan approved under title XIX of such Act in violation of 
section 1128A of such Act (42 U.S.C. 1320a–7a); or (C) a financial 
relationship for purposes of section 1877 of such Act (42 U.S.C. 
1395nn).  
Id.  
 48  DRA 5007 Medicare Hospital Gainsharing Demonstration Solicitation, supra note 46.  
The DRA required demonstration projects to meet the following criteria:  
(1) Arrangement for remuneration as share of savings.—The 
demonstration project shall involve an arrangement between a hospital 
and a physician under which the hospital provides remuneration to the 
physician that represents solely a share of the savings incurred directly 
as a result of collaborative efforts between the hospital and the 
physician.  (2) Written Plan Agreement.—The demonstration project 
shall be conducted pursuant to a written agreement that—(A) is 
submitted to the Secretary prior to implementation of the project; and 
(B) includes a plan outlining how the project will achieve 
improvements in quality and efficiency.  (3) Patient Notification.—The 
demonstration project shall include a notification process to inform 
patients who are treated in a hospital participating in the project of the 
participation of the hospital in such project.  (4) Monitoring Quality 
and Efficiency of Care.—The demonstration project shall provide 
measures to ensure that the quality and efficiency of care provided to 
patients who are treated in a hospital participating in the 
demonstration project is continuously monitored to ensure that such 
quality and efficiency is maintained or improved.  (5) Independent 
Review.—The demonstration project shall certify, prior to 
implementation, that the elements of the demonstration project are 
reviewed by an organization that is not affiliated with the hospital or 
the physician participating in the project.  (6) Referral Limitations.—
The demonstration project shall not be structured in such a manner as 
to reward any physician participating in the project on the basis of the 
volume or value of referrals to the hospital by the physician.   
Deficit Reduction Act, § 5007(b).  
 49  CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., MEDICARE GAINSHARING 
DEMONSTRATION: REPORT TO CONGRESS ON QUALITY IMPROVEMENT AND SAVINGS 12 
(Mar. 28, 2011), https://www.cms.gov/reports/downloads/
Buczko_Gain_Sharing_Final_Report_May_2011.pdf. 
 50  Id.  
 51  Medicare Hospital Gainsharing Demonstration Fact Sheet, supra note 39.  
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B. Gainsharing Models as Applied to Healthcare 
Although gainsharing can generally be described as physicians 
suggesting and implementing cost-saving measures and the hospital 
sharing the savings with the physicians, as in the Scanlon plan, there 
are a number of different forms that such a program may take.  One 
factor to consider is the method of determining compensation.  For 
example, under the “Cost Management Contracts” model, physicians 
may be compensated for time spent participating in a committee to 
determine how to implement cost savings rather than based upon the 
amount of money saved.52  If the incentive payments are tied to the 
amount saved, those implementing the program must decide how to 
distribute savings.53  Under other models, a hospital might distribute 
savings among those physicians within the practice area in which 
savings were recognized—the “Cost Per DRG” model—or those 
responsible for savings based on procedure type grouping—the “Cost 
Per Aggregate ICD-9.”54  In another model, the “Specialty 
Gainsharing” model, changes are implemented at the specialty level 
and the chair for the specialty determines how savings are 
distributed.55  Another program, “Line-item Gainsharing,” involves 
the hospital or a manager identifying the most expensive items.56  
Physicians focus on reducing the cost and are directly paid a part of 
the savings.57 
Other forms of gainsharing reduce or entirely eliminate the 
payments to physicians.  In “department management gainsharing,” a 
manager or group of managers is hired to reduce costs in each 
department and is paid a “predetermined management fee.”58  Saver 
has suggested a “three-way gainsharing” model in which a percentage 
of savings is retained by the hospital, a percentage is distributed to 
participating physicians, and the remainder is either distributed to 
patients as refunds or placed into a fund.59  Patient representatives 
 
 52  Heagan & Wood, supra note 8.   
 53  See id. 
 54  Id. 
 55  Id. 
 56  Id. 
 57  Id. 
 58  Heagan & Wood, supra note 8.   
 59  Saver, supra note 3, at 229.  This is also very similar to the “reinvestment of cost 
savings” model described by Heagan and Wood, in which a portion of the savings is 
placed in a fund and physicians can suggest uses for it.  Heagan & Wood, supra note 
8.  This model takes a similar form as Saver’s model, but does not necessarily serve 
the same purpose.  Id. 
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would manage the fund and use the money to directly improve 
patients’ experiences in the hospital.  For example, such funds may 
be used for subsidizing items that are not covered by Medicare and 
Medicaid for needy patients, adding patient libraries, providing 
internet access to patients, or upgrading family waiting rooms.60  The 
goal of such projects would be to convey to patients that the hospital 
and doctors are not benefitting from gainsharing at their expense 
and that patient welfare is a priority.61 
C. Potential Benefits and Arguments for Gainsharing as Applied to the 
Healthcare Industry 
Commentators have identified gainsharing as one method for 
reducing healthcare costs while preserving quality of care.62  
Currently, Medicare and Medicaid compensate hospitals using a set 
per-patient fee based on a patient’s diagnosis.63  The fee does not 
depend on the amount or type of care that the patient requires.64  On 
the other hand, physicians are compensated for each service 
performed.65  This creates an incentive for hospitals to reduce costs as 
much as possible while doctors do not have such an incentive.66  
Gainsharing aligns the hospital’s incentives with the doctors’ 
incentives under the common goal of reducing costs while 
maintaining quality of care.67  Physicians are encouraged to help 
hospitals save money and are not as affected by the negative financial 
implications—and the potential compromise to patient care—
associated with reducing the number of services.68 
Saver argues that obtaining physician involvement is extremely 
important to reducing costs because “[n]early all the hot-button areas 
of hospital cost escalation . . . drug costs, nursing costs, technology 
costs, etc.—can rise or fall depending upon the practice patterns of 
the hospital’s staff physicians.”69  As discussed above, those on the 
front lines are often those with the most insight into the best ways to 
 
 60  Saver, supra note 3, at 229.   
 61  Id. at 230. 
 62  See id. at 147.  
 63  Marcoux, supra note 1, at 543–44. 
 64  Id.  
 65  Id.  
 66  Id.  
 67  See Saver, supra note 3, at 154.  
 68  Id. at 180. 
 69  Id. at 176. 
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reduce costs and increase productivity.70  This observation also calls 
into question the potential effectiveness of “department management 
gainsharing,”71 which eliminates physicians from the process.  
Gainsharing may be more likely to gain physician “buy-in” than other 
cost-saving measures because, rather than imposing changes on 
physicians, the hospital asks for their input and allows them to use 
clinical judgment.72 
Perhaps the most convincing evidence in favor of gainsharing is 
the success of pilot programs.  A gainsharing program was instituted 
at Pinnacle Health Systems in Pennsylvania program in 2003.73  It 
reportedly saved $5.7 million during the three years that it ran, and 
attributed the savings largely to negotiating with vendors for better 
prices on medical supplies.74  Also, the Center for Medicare and 
Medicaid Innovation (CMMI) cited the PHCD and Medicare 
Gainsharing demonstration favorably, noting that “preliminary 
results indicate the hospitals and physicians achieved improved 
clinical and patient outcomes on measures such as decreased length 
of stay for inpatient care, which may result in savings to Medicare” 
and that “preliminary results indicate that the hospitals achieved 
internal savings due to increased efficiency.”75 
Results from the pilot program at Beth Israel Medical Center 
show that, since its demonstration began in 2006, it has saved over 
$42 million and has distributed $8 million of the savings to 
participating physicians.76  Beth Israel reports that patient outcomes 
have not suffered since the project began.77  Under the program, 
individual physicians, either an attending physician or a surgeon, 
were given financial responsibility for individual patients.78  Incentive 
payments were conditioned on maintaining quality standards, 
 
 70  See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
 71  See supra Part II.B. 
 72  Saver, supra note 3, at 215. 
 73  See Joseph Mantone, Gain-sharing Seems to be Working, But Research Shows Stent 
Savings Come From Negotiations, Not Implementations, MODERN HEALTHCARE, June 5, 
2006, at 33.   
 74  Id. 
 75  CTR. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID INNOVATION, BUNDLED PAYMENTS FOR CARE 
IMPROVEMENT INITIATIVE REQUEST FOR APPLICATION 4 (2011), available at 
http://innovation.cms.gov/Files/x/Bundled-Payments-for-Care-Improvement-
Request-for-Applications.pdf. 
 76  Phyllis Maguire, Results are in: Gainsharing Works, TODAY’S HOSPITALIST, Feb. 
2011, http://todayshospitalist.com/index.php?b=articles_read&cnt=1168. 
 77  Id.   
 78  CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., supra note 49, at 8.  
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including not having an increase in readmission rates, adverse events, 
or instances of malpractice, and meeting certain specialty-specific 
quality measures.79  CMS reported on the outcome of the first year of 
the demonstration.80  During the first year, Beth Israel distributed 
$585,000 of the savings among the 309 participating physicians.81  The 
savings were largely attributable to reduced length of stay in the 
hospital.82  Although total cost of hospitalization decreased, costs in 
the ICU increased 32% during the pilot.83  It is unclear whether this 
increase was related to the program.84  Beth Israel reported that it 
plans to expand the program to the ICU in order to control these 
costs.85 
Charleston Area Medical Center (CAMC) also established a 
gainsharing program under the demonstration program authorized 
by DRA Section 5007.86  The program focused on implementing cost-
saving initiatives with cardiac diagnosis-related groups (DRGs).87  As 
expected, gainsharing incentive payments to individual physicians 
were contingent upon actual cost savings per episode of care and 
quality of care outcomes that did not show a statistically significant 
decline after the cost-saving measures were implemented.88  CAMC 
distributed about $165,000 of the savings among approximately 100 
physicians during the first year of the demonstration program.89 
Going forward, additional hospitals will begin to participate in 
gainsharing demonstration programs.90  The acute care episode 
(ACE) demonstration project involves five hospitals within the Baptist 
 
 79  Id. 
 80  Id.  
 81  Id. at 10. 
 82  Michelle Grey Campion, Can Gainsharing Impact Cost Savings in the ICU? 
Hospital-Wide Analysis Hints at Impressive Rewards, ANESTHESIOLOGY NEWS (May 2011), 
available at http://www.anesthesiologynews.com/
ViewArticle.aspx?d=Policy+%26+Management&d_id=3&i=May+2011&i_id=729&a_id
=17116.  
 83  Id. 
 84  Id. 
 85  Id. 
 86  CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., supra note 49, at 7. 
 87  Id. 
 88  Id.  
 89  Id. at 11. 
 90  Rebecca Vesely, An ACE in the Deck? Bundled-Payment Demo Shows Returns, 
MODERN HEALTHCARE, Feb. 7, 2011, at 32–33; 12 N.J. Hospitals Paying Doctors to Save 
Money, USA TODAY (Aug. 19, 2009), available at http://www.usatoday.com/news
/health/2009-08-19-hospital-costs_N.htm. 
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Health System in San Antonio, Texas.91  The project began in 2009 
and is planned to last for three years.92  Also in 2009, a group of 
twelve hospitals in New Jersey received CMS approval to begin a 
gainsharing demonstration program.93  CMS approved the expansion 
of the program from twelve hospitals to thirty-three hospital sites, as 
part of the “Bundled Payments for Care Improvement Initiative” 
under PPACA.94  Finally, the Greater New York Hospital Association 
will begin a gainsharing program in which Medicare would “pay 
hospitals and physicians at current rates” for the first six months of 
the program while the hospitals and doctors developed and instituted 
cost-saving measures.95  Thereafter, Medicare would receive a 
“discount.”96  This program is part of the “CMS Bundled Payment for 
Care Improvement Initiative.”97 
Even outside of healthcare settings, gainsharing programs may 
not be successful or long lasting, as Dong-One Kim found.98  It largely 
will be left to the hospitals to ensure the success of their gainsharing 
programs.  Previous demonstration projects have indicated that 
gainsharing programs can succeed in the healthcare setting. 
D. Policy Concerns and Efficacy Barriers 
A frequent argument against gainsharing programs is that they 
create a perverse incentive for doctors to use lower quality products 
 
 91  Id.   
 92  Id. 
 93  12 N.J. Hospitals Paying Doctors to Save Money, supra note 90.  New Jersey 
Hospital Association (NJHA) led the effort to obtain CMS approval for the 
demonstration program.  Richard Pizzi, CMS Approves New Jersey Gainsharing 
Demonstration Project, HEALTHCARE FINANCE NEWS, (Aug. 19, 2009), 
http://www.healthcarefinancenews.com/news/ 
cms-approves-new-jersey-gainsharing-demonstration-project.  NJHA had previously 
received approval to conduct a gainsharing demonstration program in 2003.  Robert 
Wood Johnson Univ. Hosp. Inc. v. Thompson, No. Civ. A.04-142 (JWB), 2004 WL 
3210732, at *5 (D.N.J. Apr. 15, 2004).  The U.S. District Court for the District of New 
Jersey deemed the program to be a violation of the CMP Statute because the 
hospitals had not received OIG approval.  Id. at *12.  See supra notes 36–39 and 
accompanying text. 
 94  NJHA Receives Federal Approval to Expand Promising Effort to Reduce Healthcare 
Costs, PR NEWSWIRE, Feb. 1, 2013, http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/njha-
receives-federal-approval-to-expand-promising-effort-to-reduce-healthcare-costs-
189369961.html. 
 95  CMS Unveils Bundled Payment Models, GREATER N.Y. HOSP. ASS’N (Sept. 12, 
2011), http://www.gnyha.org/7652/Default.aspx.  
 96  Id. 
 97  Id.  
 98  Kim, supra note 20, at 34–36. 
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or to withhold medically necessary services in order to save money.99  
There are a number of protections to prevent this from occurring.  
First, gainsharing demonstration programs require physicians to 
meet benchmarks in terms of clinical outcomes, thus eliminating the 
potential for such perverse incentives.100  Physicians also have other 
incentives to avoid a reduction in quality of care, such as concern for 
patient well-being, concern for professional reputation, and fear of 
malpractice litigation.  These incentives would likely outweigh the 
incentive for additional financial remuneration for a large number of 
physicians.  Finally, those programs currently approved as 
demonstrations require long-term measurement of cost-savings.101  
Doctors will recognize that reducing quality of care for short-term 
savings will lead to increased overall cost in the long-term as patients 
will likely require extended hospital stays, treatment for 
complications, or readmissions to the hospital.102 
Opponents of gainsharing also argue that seeking to reduce 
services directly violates doctors’ “fiduciary and ethical duties to their 
patients.”103  This concern is the basis for the OIG’s interpretation of 
the Stark and CMP laws.104  Clinical evidence shows that in certain 
instances, reducing treatment or substituting a lower cost alternative 
can be associated with improved clinical outcomes.105  For example, 
the goal of disease-management programs is to treat patients more 
 
 99  One policy paper reports negative consequences of requiring physicians to use 
particular devices as follows:  
In Iowa, doctors constrained by a hospital’s agreement have reported 
having to transfer patients to other hospitals in order to get them the 
brand of medical device that they need.  In Pennsylvania, a physician 
has sued his hospital for using a standardization contract as a facade 
for receiving illegal kickbacks from a major manufacturer.  
MED. DEVICE MFGS. ASS’N, CONGRESS SHOULD PROHIBIT DEVICE CONTRACT GAINSHARING 
TO PROTECT PERSONALIZED PATIENT CARE AND MEDICAL DEVICE INNOVATION, available at 
http://www.medicaldevices.org/system/files/Hill.LeaveBehind.Final_000_0.pdf?dow
nload=1. 
 100  See, e.g., Sachin H. Jain & Daniel Roble, Gainsharing in Healthcare: Meeting the 
Quality-of-Care Challenge, HEALTHCARE FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, Mar. 2008, at 78 
(discussing quality measurements as a safeguard); CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID 
SERVS., DRA 5007 Medicare Hospital Gainsharing Demonstration Solicitation, available at 
https://www.cms.gov/DemoProjectsEvalRpts/downloads/DRA5007_Solicitation.pdf.  
 101  CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. supra note 49; Medicare Health Care 
Quality Demonstration Programs Fact Sheet, supra note 39.  
 102  Saver, supra note 3, at 207. 
 103  Id. at 199. 
 104  Id. 
 105  Id. at 202–03. 
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effectively but with fewer episodes of care.106  Because of this 
objective, disease-management initiatives may technically violate the 
Stark and CMP laws.107 
Potential downsides to gainsharing may be avoided by adopting 
some of the OIG’s requirements.  For example, the OIG has 
suggested that there is an incentive for “cherry picking,” keeping 
healthy patients while referring unhealthy patients, who are more 
expensive to treat, to other institutions.108  The OIG requires 
documentation of the types of patients seen by the hospital to ensure 
that hospitals and doctors do not turn away sick patients in order to 
save money.109  Also, adjusting for the severity of the patient’s 
condition will counteract any incentive to turn away unhealthy 
patients because there would not be any “penalty” for providing the 
necessary treatments associated with caring for a higher-risk patient.110  
There is also a concern that physicians who are already efficient will 
not be rewarded for efficiency, but programs can be designed to 
reward those who maintain efficiency goals, rather than meeting ever 
increasing goals.111 
The type of risks associated with a gainsharing program will 
depend upon the type of gainsharing initiatives that a healthcare 
provider adopts.  For example, the favorable advisory opinion that 
the OIG issued in 2001 involved gainsharing initiatives in a cardiology 
department.112  One of the measures adopted by the cardiology 
department involved not opening surgical supplies prior to a 
patient’s surgery so that the instruments would not be wasted if the 
surgeon did not need them.113  Such a measure does not encourage 
physicians to withhold care or otherwise change the way that patients 
are treated.  Similarly, cutting costs through purchasing items in bulk 
would not encourage physicians to “cherry-pick” patients or otherwise 
negatively impact the way that patients are treated. 
An additional concern is that gainsharing initiatives would limit 
 
 106  Id. at 212–13.   
 107  Id. 
 108  Thorton et al., supra note 28, at 3. 
 109  Hayman, supra note 35. 
 110  See Method and Sys. for Evaluating a Physician’s Economic Performance and 
Gainsharing of Physician Services, U.S. Patent No. 7,640,173 B2, at [3] (filed Dec. 29, 
2009). 
 111  See id. at [3–4]. 
 112  Re: OIG Advisory Opinion No. 01-01, 2001 WL 36190940 (HHSOIG Jan. 11, 
2001). 
 113  Id. 
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the treatment options available to physicians, thus limiting their 
freedom to make clinical decisions and negatively impacting quality 
of care through a de facto forced standardization.114  In fact, this 
result would directly contravene the purpose of the CMP Statute.  
Saver argues that imposing strict limitations on gainsharing can have 
the same effect: “[p]hysicians often have to respond flexibly and with 
some degree of innovation and experimentation as to choosing 
different treatment paths, depending upon the particular needs and 
clinical circumstances of the individual patient.”115 
Additionally, gainsharing creates the concern that excessive 
standardization of medical devices will allow manufacturers to 
increase market share and reduce competition, eventually enabling 
them to increase prices.  There has been opposition, especially from 
device manufacturers, who argue that standardization will stifle 
innovation by destroying the market for new products.116  A 
counterargument is that, at least when each contract is expired, 
hospitals and physicians will continually look for ways to save costs, 
and perhaps will be more aggressive in renegotiating contracts as a 
result.117  Also, if the programs are limited to individual departments 
within hospitals, each implementing its own cost-savings measures, 
standardization would be limited and negative effects on competition 
would be less likely. 
The risk that gainsharing programs will limit physicians’ 
freedom or stifle innovation depends upon the size of the 
gainsharing programs and the level of freedom that physicians retain 
when deciding which products to use for individual patients.  If the 
 
 114  Id. 
 115  Saver, supra note 3, at 206.   
 116  Paula DeJohn, Growing Popularity of Gainsharing Brings Pushback from 
Manufacturers, 31 HOSP. MATERIALS MGMT. 8 (2006); Gainsharing: Still the Wrong 
Answer, BIOMET (June 9, 2010 7:07 AM), 
http://www.biomet.com/corporate/ceoBlog/postDetail.cfm?postID=58; MED. 
DEVICE MFGS. ASS’N, supra note 99. 
 117  One might argue that gainsharing presents the same risk of consolidations 
and reversed incentives that has occurred in the context of Group Purchasing 
Organizations (GPOs).  Mariah Blake, Dirty Medicine, WASH. MONTHLY, July/Aug. 
2010, available at 
http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2010/1007.blake.html.  GPOs are 
organizations formed to purchase medical supplies in bulk at a discounted rate.  Id.  
In 1986, GPOs were granted an exemption from the AKS, which made it lawful for 
suppliers to pay GPOs “fees,” which were essentially a portion of their revenue. “This 
created an incentive to cater to the sellers rather than to the buyers.”  Id.; Frank 
Pasquale, Understanding Medicine’s Middlemen, BALKINIZATION (July 12, 2010), 
http://balkin.blogspot.com/2010/07/understanding-medicines-middlemen.html.  
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programs are limited to individual departments within hospitals, each 
implementing its own cost-saving measures, standardization would be 
limited.  If, however, cost-saving measures were implemented on a 
broader basis, standardization, and possible detrimental effects on 
innovation, would be possible. 
III. LEGAL BARRIERS TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF GAINSHARING 
PROGRAMS IN HEALTHCARE SETTINGS 
A number of legal barriers, including regulations of tax-exempt 
entities, the AKS, the Stark Law, and the CMP Statute, have curtailed 
the establishment of gainsharing programs in healthcare.  In recent 
years, the OIG’s inconsistent decisions about whether it will enforce 
these laws against hospital gainsharing programs have compounded 
this problem.118 
A. Violations Related to Hospitals’ Tax-exempt Status 
Tax-exempt organizations may not use their earnings to benefit 
any “person with a personal and private interest in the activities of the 
organization” including doctors.119  Tax-exempt organizations also 
may not serve any private interest unless the private interest is 
incidental to serving the public interest.120  In order to be incidental 
to serving the public interest, the private interest “must be both 
qualitatively and quantitatively incidental.”121  “Qualitatively 
incidental” means that the interest is a “necessary concomitant of the 
activity that benefits the public at large and the benefit cannot be 
achieved without necessarily benefiting certain private individuals.”122  
“Quantitatively incidental” means that the interest is “neither direct 
nor substantial in comparison to the benefit conferred on the public 
by the activity.”123  The penalty to a physician or other individual 
deemed a “disqualified person” for violating this law is 25% of the 
excess benefit and, “if the excess benefit is not corrected, an 
additional tax equal to 200% of the excess benefit.”124 
 
 118  Barry F. Rosen, Commentary: Clearer Guidance on Gainsharing Would Lower Costs, 
DAILY RECORD, July 7, 2009. 
 119  Heagan & Wood, supra note 8 (citing Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)). 
 120  Id. 
 121  Id. 
 122  Id.; see also I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 37,789 (Dec. 18, 1978); Rev. Rul. 70-186, 
1970-1 C.B. 128; I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,498 (Jan. 28, 1986). 
 123  Heagan & Wood, supra note 8; see also I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 37,789 (Dec. 
18, 1978). 
 124  Heagan & Wood, supra note 8.   
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It is unclear whether gainsharing payments to physicians would 
qualify as qualitatively incidental.  Cost-saving initiatives could be 
instituted without providing the financial benefits of gainsharing to 
doctors, which means that the benefit to the public—reduced 
healthcare costs—could be achieved without benefitting private 
individuals.  This could be accomplished under the “reinvestment of 
cost savings” model, or a variation on the “three-way costs savings 
model,” both discussed in Part II.B supra.  If the doctors’ shares of the 
savings were reinvested in patient projects, hospitals and doctors 
could avoid any private benefit.  Importantly, however, gainsharing 
programs may be less successful if physicians do not have financial 
incentives to cut costs. 
According to some commentators, other forms of gainsharing 
can be modeled to comply with the regulations.125  In order to avoid 
penalties, gainsharing programs must pay doctors a reasonable 
compensation, taking into account the benefit conferred and the 
“fair market value” of the doctors’ services.126  The doctors’ 
compensation must be “the result of arm’s length bargaining . . . 
[and] must not be merely a device to distribute profits to insiders.”127  
The payments must also be “based on personally performed services, 
and tied to quality and efficiency measures monitored by an 
independent expert.”128  A safe harbor also exists,129 but it contains a 
number of requirements related to the governance of the hospital, 
and so it is unlikely to protect gainsharing programs.130  Finally, a 
program may also be deemed to be in compliance with the law based 
 
 125  See id. 
 126  Id.   
 127  Id.   
 128  Claiborne et al., supra note 7, at 489. 
 129  Rev. Proc. 97-13, 1997-1 C.B. 632 (1997); Claiborne et al., supra note 128, at 
489. 
 130  In order to satisfy this safe harbor, a hospital would have to ensure that:  
(a) Not more than 20 percent of the voting power of the governing 
body of the qualified user in the aggregate is vested in the service 
provider and its directors, officers, shareholders, and employees; (b) 
Overlapping board members do not include the chief executive 
officers of the service provider or its governing body or the qualified 
user or its governing body; and (c) The qualified user and the service 
provider under the contract are not related parties, as defined in § 
1.150-1(b). 
Rev. Proc. 97-13, 1997-1 C.B. 632 (1997).  Although a hospital may fall under these 
exceptions, it would be unlikely that a hospital would re-organize its governance in 
order to satisfy the safe harbor.  
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on the relevant “facts and circumstances”.131 
B. Anti-Kickback Statute 
The federal AKS imposes criminal penalties and potential fines 
on: 
whoever knowingly and willfully solicits or receives any 
remuneration (including any kickback, bribe, or rebate) 
directly or indirectly, overtly or covertly, in cash or in 
kind . . . in return for referring an individual to a person for 
the furnishing or arranging for the furnishing of any item 
or service for which payment may be made in whole or in 
part under a Federal health care program.132 
Gainsharing programs can violate this statute because gainsharing 
may incentivize physicians to refer patients to the hospital, including 
Medicare and Medicaid patients whose care will be paid for as part of 
a federal healthcare program.133  This incentive may exist because 
increasing the volume of patients would increase the overall savings 
included in the gainsharing program.134 
As of 2009, there were no safe harbors that protected 
gainsharing programs from liability for violating the AKS, but 
hospitals could seek an advisory opinion from the OIG.135  The statute 
does contain a safe harbor for “[p]ersonal services and management 
 
 131  Claiborne et al., supra note 7, at 489 (citing I.R.S. Private Letter Ruling 
200926005 (Mar. 17, 2009)).   
 132  42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(1) (2012); see also Heagan & Wood, supra note 8.   
 133  Saver, supra note 3, at 171 n.100.   
 134  Id. 
 135  Claiborne et al., supra note 128, at 489.  Since 2001, the OIG has issued 13 
advisory opinions regarding gainsharing programs, finding that each program would 
or could potentially violate the CMP Statute and AKS but stating that the OIG would 
not impose sanctions.  Re: OIG Advisory Opinion No. 09-06, 2009 WL 2371264 
(HHSOIG June 23, 2009), 1; Re: OIG Advisory Opinion No. 08-15, 2008 WL 6067525 
(HHSOIG Oct. 6, 2008), 1; Re: OIG Advisory Opinion No. 08-09, 2008 WL 6067519 
(HHSOIG Jul. 31, 2008), 1; Re: OIG Advisory Opinion No. 07-21, 2007 WL 6400848 
(HHSOIG Dec. 28, 2007), 1; Re: OIG Advisory Opinion No. 07-22, 2007 WL 6400849 
(HHSOIG Dec. 28, 2007), 1; Re: OIG Advisory Opinion No. 06-22, 2006 WL 6252293 
(HHSOIG Nov. 9, 2006), 1; Re: OIG Advisory Opinion No. 05-06, 2005 WL 6289869 
(HHSOIG Feb. 18, 2005), 1; Re: OIG Advisory Opinion No. 05-05, 2005 WL 6289868 
(HHSOIG Feb. 18, 2005), 1; Re: OIG Advisory Opinion No. 05-04, 2005 WL 6289867 
(HHSOIG Feb. 10, 2005), 1; Re: OIG Advisory Opinion No. 05-03, 2005 WL 6289866 
(HHSOIG Feb. 10, 2005), 1; Re: OIG Advisory Opinion No. 05-02, 2005 WL 6289865 
(HHSOIG Feb. 10, 2005), 1; Re: OIG Advisory Opinion No. 05-01, 2005 WL 6289864 
(HHSOIG Jan. 28, 2005), 1; Re: OIG Advisory Opinion No. 01-01, 2001 WL 36190940 
(HHSOIG Jan. 11, 2001), 1. 
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contracts.”136  The safe harbor states that the term “remuneration,” as 
defined by the statute, does not include payments made to an agent 
for the agent’s services, pursuant to an agency agreement.137  But the 
regulation’s requirements would preclude many gainsharing 
agreements.  For example, the “aggregate compensation paid to the 
agent over the term of the agreement [must be] set in advance.”138  
Many gainsharing models determine the amount of compensation 
after the cost-savings initiatives have been instituted based on the 
amount of money saved.139  Although the amount could be set in 
advance based on a different metric—e.g., the number of hours 
dedicated to meeting and developing ideas—or upon the projected 
amount of savings, setting the amount in advance could diminish the 
level of incentive to follow through with the cost-saving initiative.  
Thus, it is unlikely that any of the safe harbors sufficiently protect 
gainsharing programs from violating the AKS.140 
C. Stark Law 
The federal Stark Law prohibits physicians with a financial 
relationship with a particular “entity” from referring patients to the 
entity for services that would otherwise be paid using Medicaid or 
Medicare funds.141  It also prohibits “entities” from making claims for 
payment under such circumstances.142  The statute defines “financial 
 
 136  42 C.F.R. § 1001.952(d); see also Heagan & Wood, supra note 8. 
 137  42 C.F.R. § 1001.952(d); see also Heagan & Wood, supra note 8.   
 138  42 C.F.R. § 1001.952(d).   
 139  See Part II.B supra.   
 140  Additionally, there are some state statutes that are similar to the federal AKS, 
and therefore hospitals must be cognizant of the risk of violating state law as well as 
federal law when instituting a gainsharing program.  Heagan & Wood, supra note 8; 
see, e.g. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 456.054 (West 2006); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-113-60 (1994); 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-20-4 (West 2007).  This issue, however, is beyond the scope of 
this Comment. 
 141  42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(a)(1) (2006). 
 142  Id.  Entity is defined as  
[a] physician’s sole practice or a practice of multiple physicians or any 
other person, sole proprietorship, public or private agency or trust, 
corporation, partnership, limited liability company, foundation, 
nonprofit corporation, or unincorporated association that furnishes 
DHS [designated health services]. An entity does not include the 
referring physician himself or herself, but does include his or her 
medical practice. 
 42 C.F.R. § 411.351. Designated health services includes:  
(i) Clinical laboratory services. (ii) Physical therapy, occupational 
therapy, and outpatient speech-language pathology services. (iii) 
Radiology and certain other imaging services. (iv) Radiation therapy 
MARTINGANO-REINHART (DO NOT DELETE) 10/22/2013  2:24 PM 
1346 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:1325 
 
relationship” to include: “a compensation arrangement . . . between 
the physician . . . and the entity.”143  The statute carves out an 
exception for employment relationships in which the physician is 
compensated for “identifiable services.”144  It also includes an 
exception for “personal services” under a written agreement.145  There 
also is a “physician incentive plan exception,” but payment cannot be 
made as “an inducement to reduce or limit medically necessary 
services.”146 
An additional exception was proposed in 2008 that would have 
allowed hospitals to institute gainsharing programs for up to three 
years, provided the programs met certain conditions.147  The 
finalization of the rule, however, was delayed and the American 
Hospital Association, Federation of American Hospitals, and the 
Association of American Medical Colleges recommended changes to 
the rule because it contained too many restrictions to “allow for 
innovation and the types of physician-hospital efforts to maximize 
quality of health care.”148  This rule has not been instituted to date. 
This may add to hospitals’ hesitation in establishing gainsharing 
programs.  Currently, hospitals may run gainsharing programs that 
the OIG has approved via advisory opinions.149  The OIG only issues 
opinions as to the AKS and CMP statute,150 but it has generally not 
enforced the Stark Law against gainsharing programs that have 
received such approvals.151  But should it promulgate an exception, 
 
services and supplies. (v) Durable medical equipment and supplies. 
(vi) Parenteral and enteral nutrients, equipment, and supplies. (vii) 
Prosthetics, orthotics, and prosthetic devices and supplies. (viii) Home 
health services. (ix) Outpatient prescription drugs. (x) Inpatient and 
outpatient hospital services. 
Id.  
 143  42 U.S.C. § 1395nn(a)(2)(B) (2006).   
 144  Id. § 1395nn(e).   
 145  Heagan & Wood, supra note 8.   
 146  Id.  The term “medically necessary” is not defined in either the statute or the 
OIG’s decisions, but Medicare defines “medically necessary” services as: “Services or 
supplies that are needed for the diagnosis or treatment of [a patient’s] medical 
condition and meet accepted standards of medical practice.”  Home Health Agency and 
Home Care Glossary of Definitions, MEDICARE, 
http://www.medicare.gov/homehealthcompare/(S(vfj5vd55qyihdqbiikpxu4rd))/ 
Resources/Glossary.aspx?Choice=M (last visited Apr. 24, 2012). 
 147  Claiborne et al., supra note 7, at 487–88. 
 148  Id. at 488 (citing Hospital Industry Groups Urge CMS To Ease Use of Gainsharing 
Deals, Revisit Proposal, HEALTH CARE FRAUD REP. (BNA) No. 13 (Feb. 25, 2009)). 
 149  Claiborne et al., supra note 7, at 488.   
 150  Rosen, supra note 118. 
 151  Claiborne et al., supra note 7, at 488. 
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programs already in existence could find themselves in violation of 
the exception if the programs do not meet the requirements.152 
D. Civil Monetary Penalties Statute 
Under the CMP Statute, hospitals may not directly or indirectly 
compensate doctors for “reduc[ing] or limit[ing] services provided” 
to Medicare or Medicaid patients.153  The statute provides for a fine of 
up to $2000 per patient for both the doctor and the hospital.154  
Congress passed the CMP Statute after creating the Medicare 
Prospective Payment System (PPS), which reimbursed hospitals for 
treating Medicare patients on a per-patient basis, rather than on a 
fee-for-service basis.155  Under a per-patient payment system, a hospital 
receives a set amount of money for each patient treated, based on the 
patient’s diagnosis and regardless of the amount or type of care 
provided.156  In contrast, payment on a fee-for-service basis means that 
a physician is compensated for each treatment given to the patient so 
that treatment costs for a particular condition will vary from patient 
to patient and from doctor to doctor.157  Medicare continued to 
reimburse doctors on a fee-for-service basis even after Medicare 
began reimbursing hospitals on a per-patient basis.158  Therefore, 
there was concern that hospitals would attempt to reduce the costs 
associated with patient care by paying doctors to reduce the services 
rendered.159 
The CMP Statute does not define the terms “reduce or limit” or 
“services,” and, in a Special Advisory Bulletin, the OIG adopted a 
broad interpretation of the statute, as applied to “any physician 
incentive plan that conditions hospital payments to physicians or 
physician groups on savings attributable to reduction in hospital costs 
for treatment.”160  The OIG does not assume that the services must be 
medically necessary in order for the statute to apply: “In our view, this 
interpretation is plainly wrong.  Simply put, the language of the 
statute refers to ‘services,’ not ‘medically necessary services,’ and 
 
 152  Id. 
 153  42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a (2012); see also Saver, supra note 3, at 155. 
 154  § 1320a-7a; see also Heagan & Wood, supra note 8. 
 155  Marcoux, supra note 1, at 543–44. 
 156  Id. at 543. 
 157  Id. 
 158  Id. 
 159  Id. at 543–44. 
 160  Claiborne et al., supra note 7, at 486–87 (internal citation and quotation marks 
omitted). 
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requires a showing of an intent to induce a reduction of services, not 
an actual reduction.”161  Claiborne recommended that Congress 
amend the statute to include the words “medically necessary services,” 
thus making it acceptable for hospitals to compensate physicians for 
reducing services that are not medically necessary as part of 
gainsharing programs.162 
By contrast, managed care organizations (MCOs) are not 
allowed to pay doctors to “reduce or limit medically necessary services to 
Medicare and Medicaid patients.”163  Thus, MCOs are limited in their 
ability to enact gainsharing programs, but not to the same degree 
that hospitals are limited.164  The OIG has concluded that the 
difference in wording signifies Congress’s desire to provide MCOs 
with some discretion so that they could save costs, while preventing 
hospitals from denying any services to Medicare and Medicaid 
patients.165 
IV. GAINSHARING IN THE CONTEXT OF THE PATIENT PROTECTION AND 
AFFORDABLE CARE ACT 
PPACA contains several provisions that, while not addressing the 
laws discussed above, do aim to promote gainsharing programs.  
Notably, § 3022 of PPACA creates the “Medicare Shared Savings 
Program,” which would require accountable care organizations 
(ACOs) to “have a formal legal structure that would allow the 
organization to receive and distribute payments for shared savings.”166  
ACOs are “groups of doctors, hospitals, and other health care 
providers, who come together voluntarily to give coordinated high 
quality care to their Medicare patients.”167  The Medicare Shared 
Savings Program enables Medicare to “share a percentage of the 
achieved savings with the ACO” provided the ACO “meet[s] both the 
quality performance standards and generate[s] shareable savings.”168  
 
 161  Recent Commentary Distorts HHS OIG’s Gainsharing Bulletin, 1999 WL 
34984741 (HHSOIG), 1, available at https://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/docs
/alertsandbulletins/bnagain.htm. 
 162  Claiborne et al., supra note 7, at 492. 
 163  Heagan & Wood, supra note 8 (emphasis added).   
 164  Saver, supra note 3, at 164–66.   
 165  Id. 
 166  42 U.S.C. § 1395jjj(b)(2)(C) (2006). 
 167  Accountable Care Organizations Overview, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., 
https://www.cms.gov/ACO/ (last visited Apr. 2, 2013).  
 168   Medicare Program, Medicare Shared Savings Program: Accountable Care 
Organizations, 76 Fed. Reg. 67802, 67804 (Nov. 2, 2011) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. 
pt. 425). 
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CMS and the OIG have the authority to waive the AKS, Stark Law, 
and the CMP for ACOs.169  This program, however, does not include 
doctors and hospitals that are not part of an ACO.170 
PPACA also provides additional funding for the gainsharing 
demonstration and extends the program, which was set to expire in 
2010, through 2014 or until the funds are exhausted.171  Although this 
was certainly a step to encourage further demonstration programs, 
the trouble is that it requires a very long time to collect data, and 
even then the amount of data collected is small.172  Also, the 
demonstration programs’ requirement for budget neutrality may be 
too strict, which disallows cost-saving initiatives with high up-front 
costs mitigated by long-term savings.173 
PPACA does not specifically remove the legal barriers discussed 
above.  It also does not address the concerns raised with regard to 
Treasury Regulation 1.501(c)(3)-1(c), under which a gainsharing 
program could be found to cause net earnings to “inure to the 
benefit of private shareholders or individuals,” jeopardizing the 
hospital’s tax-exempt status.174  With regard to the AKS, PPACA § 
6402 creates 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7a(i)(6)(F), which provides that the 
term “remuneration” under the statute does not include “any other 
remuneration which promotes access to care and poses a low risk of 
harm to patients and Federal health care programs (as defined in 
section 1128B(f) and designated by the Secretary under 
regulations).”175  This is unlikely to apply to remuneration for 
gainsharing programs, however, because such programs do not 
directly “promote access to care.”  PPACA also does not include any 
amendments to the Stark Law that would create an exception to the 
 
 169  See Medicare Program; Waiver Designs in Connection with the Medicare 
Shared Savings Program and the Innovation Center, 76 Fed. Reg. 19655, 19656 (Apr. 
7, 2011). 
 170  See generally Frank Pasquale, Accountable Care Organizations in the Affordable Care 
Act, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 1371, 1381 (2012) (cautioning that there are risks to pilot 
programs such as the influence of special interest groups, and attempting to 
“temper” the enthusiasm for ACOs by also discussing the challenges). 
 171  42 U.S.C. § 18001 (2010). 
 172  MedPAC Chair: CMS Has Authority to Expand Pilots but Lacks Money, 13 INSIDE 
CMS 14 (July 8, 2010).   
 173  Stuart Guterman & Michelle P. Serber, Enhancing Value in Medicare: 
Demonstrations and Other Initiatives to Improve the Program 23 (The Commonwealth 
Fund/Alliance for Health Reform Jan. 2007). 
 174  See supra Part III.A. 
 175  Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act § 6402, 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-
7a(i)(6)(F) (2012). 
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law for gainsharing programs.176  With regard to the CMP Statute, 
PPACA includes amendments related to correction of reporting 
errors and to the procedures involved in collecting civil monetary 
penalties; the amendments do not address gainsharing.177 
PPACA does give CMS the authority to waive the CMP Statute 
and the AKS and immunizes these waivers from judicial and 
administrative review—according to the chair of the Medicare 
Payment Advisory Commission—in order to expand the 
demonstration program.178  This is helpful because hospitals seeking 
to participate in demonstration programs will no longer be required 
to obtain separate approval from the OIG.  This provision is 
inadequate, however, because it does not address the potential for 
gainsharing programs to violate the Stark Law or the tax regulations 
and only applies to hospitals participating in demonstration 
programs.  The OIG itself, in its 1999 Advisory Bulletin, stated that 
“case by case determinations by advisory opinions are an inadequate 
and inequitable substitute for comprehensive and uniform 
regulation.”179 
Additionally, PPACA makes violations of the AKS more risky.  
Prior to PPACA, a violation of the AKS could trigger penalties under 
the False Claims Act (FCA), which provides for penalties of up to 
$11,000 for each fraudulent claim a party submits to the government 
for reimbursement, but it would not do so automatically.180  PPACA 
added a provision explicitly stating that a violation of the AKS 
constitutes a “false or fraudulent claim” under the FCA.181 
It is unlikely that Congress will permanently amend statutes until 
the pilot programs prove to be effective, but the pilot programs thus 
far have been too small to provide sufficient data.182  Although the 
additional authority given to CMS may encourage participation in the 
gainsharing demonstrations,183 providing statutory safe harbors or 
 
 176  The only amendments are related to exemptions for referrals for certain 
imaging and scans and “other designated health services . . . that the Secretary deems 
appropriate,” and mandating the establishment of procedures for reporting 
violations of the law.  42 U.S.C. § 18001 Sec. 6003 (2006); see id. § 18001 Sec. 6409. 
 177  42 U.S.C. § 18001 Sec. 6111 (2010). 
 178  MedPAC Chair: CMS Has Authority to Expand Pilots but Lacks Money, supra note 
172.   
 179  OIG Special Advisory Bulletin, supra note 28. 
 180  See 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (2006). 
 181  42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(g) (2012). 
 182  Id. 
 183  PPACA “establishes at least 35 pilot programs and demonstrations,” that test 
different methods of payment and forms of healthcare delivery. FURROW ET AL., 
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making appropriate amendments to the applicable laws would enable 
gainsharing on a more widespread basis.184 
The chair of the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission 
argued that there are insufficient funds to promote gainsharing 
demonstrations.185  The lack of funding creates a “catch-22” whereby 
gainsharing is only permitted on a limited basis until pilot data is 
available, but limiting the allowable gainsharing programs limits the 
amount of available pilot data.186  Enacting statutory changes will 
make hospitals more willing to invest in gainsharing programs.187  
Some have argued that hospitals’ hesitation to establish gainsharing 
programs is due to a lack of government funding in general.188  The 
argument may be that hospitals do not have enough incentive to 
incur the costs to start up such programs because they are not 
guaranteed a benefit.189  This argument, however, disregards the fact 
that the nature of gainsharing makes the largest costs, the payment to 
the doctors, contingent upon savings to the hospital.  Removing legal 
barriers will reduce the risks associated with establishing a 
gainsharing program and will make hospitals more willing to invest 
financial resources. 
V. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS 
Advisory opinions have been insufficient in promoting 
 
HEALTH CARE REFORM SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS 176 (Thomson Reuters 2011); see 
also Atul Gawande, Testing, Testing, NEW YORKER, Dec. 14, 2009, available at, 
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2009/12/14/091214fa_fact_gawande 
(arguing that employing trial and error via pilot programs is an important way to 
“curb costs and increase quality”).  
 184  MedPAC Chair: CMS Has Authority to Expand Pilots but Lacks Money, supra note 
172. 
 185  Id.  
 186  See id. 
 187  See discussion supra Part V for recommended statutory changes; see also Peter 
D. Jacobson et al., Regulating the U.S. Health Care System: Failure in Motion, 36 J. HEALTH 
POL. POL’Y & L. 583, 585–86 (2011) (noting generally that OIG’s approach to the 
legality of gainsharing arrangements creates uncertainty, which “limits the expansion 
of existing economic relationships because it is difficult to predict which 
arrangements will satisfy regulators”); Edward Correia, Aligning Physician Decision-
Making with the Goals of Health Care Organizations: Are There Any Lessons from Law 
Firms?, 28 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 224, 246–48 (2012) (“[Health care 
organizations] should not have to live with the uncertainty of the statute and the 
burden of having to seek an advisory opinion in every case.”). 
 188  Gainsharing Gets Boost; Projects Still Lack Funding, MODERN PHYSICIAN, June 9, 
2008, available at http://www.modernphysician.com/article/ 
20080609/MODERNPHYSICIAN/363294579.   
 189  See id. 
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gainsharing because entities may be penalized if the law changes in a 
way that subsequently renders an advisory opinion void.  Also, if 
entities establish gainsharing programs and then the law changes, 
conforming to changes in the law could be costly and could eliminate 
any savings recognized by instituting the program.  Hospitals and 
physicians must have a sense of security that the law will not change 
in this manner or that, if the law changes, Congress and regulatory 
agencies will exempt programs that have already been established. 
A. Tax-exempt Organizations 
The Treasury Department should provide a safe harbor to the 
requirement in Treasury Regulation § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(2).190  An 
argument against this action is that it could invite fraud.  Hospitals 
might create purported gainsharing programs that do not institute 
any cost-saving or quality-improving measures, but simply serve to 
 
 190  See generally IRS Notice 2011-20, http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-drop/n-11-20.pdf.  
There are also concerns that tax-exempt ACOs will violate this regulation by 
participating in the Medicare Shared Savings Program.  See IRS Notice Regarding 
Participation in the MSSP through an ACO, 2011 WL 1219269 (Apr. 18, 2011).  The IRS 
issued a notice soliciting comments on whether it has provided sufficient guidance as 
to how ACOs can avoid violating restrictions on private inurement.  See id.  The 
notice states that:  
[T]he IRS expects that it will not consider a tax-exempt organization’s 
participation in the MSSP through an ACO to result in inurement or 
impermissible private benefit to the private party ACO participants 
where: 
· The terms of the tax-exempt organization’s participation in the MSSP 
through the ACO (including its share of MSSP payments or losses and 
expenses) are set forth in advance in a written agreement negotiated at 
arm’s length. 
· CMS has accepted the ACO into, and has not terminated the ACO 
from, the MSSP. 
· The tax-exempt organization’s share of economic benefits derived 
from the ACO (including its share of MSSP payments) is proportional 
to the benefits or contributions the tax-exempt organization provides 
to the ACO. If the tax-exempt organization receives an ownership 
interest in the ACO, the ownership interest received is proportional 
and equal in value to its capital contributions to the ACO and all ACO 
returns of capital, allocations and distributions are made in proportion 
to ownership interests. 
· The tax-exempt organization’s share of the ACO’s losses (including 
its share of MSSP losses) does not exceed the share of ACO economic 
benefits to which the tax-exempt organization is entitled. 
· All contracts and transactions entered into by the tax-exempt 
organization with the ACO and the ACO’s participants, and by the 
ACO with the ACO’s participants and any other parties, are at fair 
market value. 
Id.  
MARTINGANO-REINHART (DO NOT DELETE) 10/22/2013  2:24 PM 
2013] COMMENT 1353 
 
distribute profits illegally.  Although fraud is a concern, the safe 
harbor provision could contain many of the same requirements 
contained within the proposed Stark Law exception and the 
demonstration programs.191  For example, the Treasury Department 
could require hospitals to maintain documentation of the measures 
implemented, the baseline measures of performance, and ongoing 
measurements of quality of care and cost savings.  Upon an audit, the 
hospital would be required to produce this documentation.  Adding 
such a requirement to the safe harbor would not add any additional 
costs to the hospitals because they would already be required to take 
these steps in order to qualify for other safe harbor provisions. 
B. Anti-Kickback Statute 
The AKS should be amended to include a safe harbor for 
gainsharing programs.  As discussed above in the context of treasury 
regulations, the safe harbor could include several requirements to 
ensure that only bona fide programs qualify for the safe harbor.192  
Additionally, these requirements would not burden hospitals with any 
costs that they would not otherwise have to bear.193  As with providing 
a safe harbor under Treasury Regulation § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(2), 
providing a safe harbor for gainsharing programs under the AKS 
could invite fraud.  The safe harbor provision could contain 
requirements like those in the proposed Stark Law exception and the 
demonstration programs to deter fraud.194 
C. Stark Law 
The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid proposed an exception 
to the Stark Law in 2008.  The exception would have applied to 
payments made to physicians participating in: 
certain documented incentive payments or shared savings 
programs designed to achieve (1) improvement of the 
quality of hospital patient care services by changing 
physician clinical or administrative practices, and/or (2) 
actual costs savings for the hospital resulting from the 
reduction of waste or changes in a physician’s clinical or 
administrative practices, without an adverse effect on or 
 
 191  See supra notes 48 & 49 and accompanying test for requirements of 
gainsharing programs in demonstration programs; see infra notes 195–201 and 
accompanying text for a discussion of the proposed Stark exception. 
 192  See supra note 191 and accompanying text. 
 193  See supra Part V.A. 
 194  See supra note 191 and accompanying text. 
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diminution in the quality of hospital patient care services.195 
This exception would only apply to incentive programs that met 
certain criteria.196  Programs would be required to identify cost-saving 
or quality-improvement measures and to track the success of these 
measures.197  Hospitals would then set goals for performance 
measures and identify baseline levels.198  Under the proposed 
exception, programs would be required to include at least five 
physicians and to give all physicians within the applicable specialty 
the opportunity to participate without regard to the physician’s 
patient volume or level of “business generated for the hospital.”199  
The hospital would be prohibited from limiting the products 
available to doctors or preventing them from adopting new 
technologies that are “linked to improved outcomes.”200  The 
exception also required the hospital to disclose to patients that it had 
established a gainsharing program and would have required hospitals 
to maintain records of the cost-saving measures.201 
CMS did not adopt the proposed exception of a number of 
concerns, in particular that it was too restrictive to permit 
innovation.202  In an advocacy letter to CMS, the American Hospital 
Association, Association of American Medical Colleges, and the 
Federation of American Hospitals stated that “[b]y regulating not 
only the ‘what’ but the ‘how’ of an incentive payment or shared-
savings program, CMS limits hospitals’ ability to incorporate the 
health care community’s evolving understanding of what contributes 
to patient quality and safety.”203  Also, the exception only applied to 
programs that did not violate other federal statutes—notably, 
gainsharing programs are also likely to violate the AKS and CMP 
statute.204 
 
 195  Hayman, supra note 35.   
 196  Id. 
 197  Id. 
 198  Id. 
 199  Id. 
 200  Id. 
 201  Hayman, supra note 195. 
 202  Claiborne et al., supra note 128, at 488. 
 203  Letter from Rick Pollack, Exec. Vice President of the Am. Hosp. Ass’n, Joanne 
Conroy, Chief Health Care Officer of the Ass’n of Am. Med. Colleges & Charles N. 
Kahn III, President of the Fed’n of Am. Hosps., to Charlene Frizzera, Acting Adm’r 
of the Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs. (Feb. 17, 2009), available at 
http://www.aha.org/advocacy-issues/letter/2009/090217-cl-CMS-1403-FC.pdf. 
 204  See Part I.B and III.D supra for discussion of the legal barriers posed by the 
AKS and CMP laws. 
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The proposed exception takes into account a number of the 
concerns that have been expressed about gainsharing and therefore 
should be used as a model in enacting a new exception.  Specifically, 
the requirement that hospitals set goals and identify baseline 
measures and track performance will help ensure that physicians feel 
they are compensated fairly, thus increasing “buy-in” and motivation 
to participate.205  Prohibitions against limiting the products available 
and the use of new technologies protect the physicians from being 
excessively controlled and allow them to exercise clinical judgment.  
They also simultaneously protect individual patients from being 
denied specialized care.  The requirement that hospitals disclose the 
establishment of the gainsharing program to patients maintains 
transparency and will help prevent patients from thinking they are 
being shortchanged.206  According to the OIG’s 2005 opinions, 
hospitals must disclose the gainsharing program to patients in 
writing, preferably before patients are admitted, but otherwise prior 
to surgery.207 
The proposed exception, however, demands that hospitals 
identify the cost-saving or quality improvement measures up front.208  
As Saver noted, part of the gainsharing process is to solicit 
suggestions for cost-saving measures.209  By requiring hospitals to 
identify the cost-saving measures up-front, the law may indirectly 
require them to solicit suggestions from physicians before there is any 
guarantee that the suggestions can legally be implemented.  
Although this may not seem prohibitive, it would involve using 
physicians’ time to discuss the suggestions and the likelihood of 
success of cost-saving measures.  Depending on the type of measures 
suggested, involvement of administrative personnel and other staff 
 
 205  See Part II.C supra, stating that gainsharing programs in general may be more 
likely than other cost-saving measures to encourage physician “buy-in.” 
 206  According to one longitudinal study, there was no statistically significant 
difference between overall patient satisfaction before and after the institution of a 
gainsharing program. Charles Foster & Lynn Godkin, “Gainsharing” and Patient 
Satisfaction, HEALTH PROGRESS, July/Aug. 2000, at 47–48,  available at 
http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&frm=1&source=web&cd=5&ved=
0CEAQFjAE&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.chausa.org%2Fworkarea%2FDownloadAsse
t.aspx%3Fid%3D2147483964&ei=dZe1Tt3LEKjg2AXLxNDMDQ&usg=AFQjCNHd3-
0yr_wuVAQSV7-IQ1jW8PF_eg&sig2=W4mdptcp5rpEmMjrX6TpRA. The article, 
however, states that all non-management employees were included in the program 
and does not describe the nature of the cost-saving measures taken.  Id. at 43. 
 207  Barry F. Rosen & Jacy D’Aiutolo, Commentary: Doctors May Share in Hospitals’ 
Cost Cuts, Sometimes, DAILY RECORD, Sept. 9, 2005. 
 208  Hayman, supra note 35. 
 209  Saver, supra note 3, at 170–71.   
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members may be required to assess the feasibility of the suggestions.  
This amounts to an investment on the part of the hospital without 
any guarantee that the measures could legally be implemented.  To 
avoid this problem, the exception could include a grace period 
during which the hospital and physicians, having already committed 
to a gainsharing arrangement, could identify cost-saving measures 
and establish the necessary benchmarks. 
Saver and others have proposed an alternative interpretation for 
the restriction against paying doctors to “limit or reduce services” for 
Medicare and Medicaid patients.210  The OIG has interpreted these 
statutes to apply to any services, whether or not the services are 
medically necessary.211  Medicare’s reimbursement rules, however, 
state that Medicare will only reimburse for services that are 
“reasonable and necessary.”212  Therefore, one could argue that the 
words “medically necessary” are inherently implied in the Stark Law 
and CMP Statute.213  A reversal of opinion by the OIG, however, 
might not provide hospitals with the sense of security needed to 
incentivize them to institute gainsharing programs.  There could be 
an ongoing concern that the OIG will revisit the decision and return 
to its former interpretation. 
D. CMP Statute 
As discussed above, under the CMP Statute, the OIG may seek 
civil monetary penalties from hospitals that pay physicians to reduce 
or limit services for Medicare and Medicaid patients and on 
physicians who accept such payments.214  The OIG has interpreted 
this statute to include all services, even those that are not medically 
necessary.215  Saver suggested that the OIG’s interpretation of the 
statute was incorrect, and that the statute, by its nature, would only 
apply to situations in which a physician limited or reduced services 
 
 210  Id. at 165 n.71.   
 211  Claiborne et al., supra note 7, at 486–87.   
 212  Saver, supra note 3, at 165 n.71.  The term “reasonable and necessary” has not 
been defined by statute; its meaning has been debated.  Timothy P. Blanchard, 
Medical Necessity” Determinations—A Continuing Healthcare Policy Problem, 37 J. HEALTH 
L. 599, 604 (2004).  Blanchard suggests that the term “reasonable” and “necessary” 
may take cost into account as well as the patient’s health: “What ‘necessary’ services 
are ‘reasonable’ for taxpayers or members of an insurance risk pool to shoulder?” Id.  
 213  Id.   
 214  42 U.S.C § 1320a-7a (2006).   
 215  Claiborne et al., supra note 7, at 486–87.   
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that were medically necessary.216  Although this is a compelling 
argument, a change in the OIG’s interpretation may not be sufficient 
because, without an actual change to the statute, the OIG may reverse 
its decision.  In order to encourage hospitals to establish gainsharing 
programs, more certainty is needed. 
Claiborne has proposed that the CMP Statute’s application to 
gainsharing programs could be resolved by amending the statute to 
include the words “medically necessary” so that the statute prohibits 
paying doctors to reduce or limit medically necessary services.217  It is 
likely that this would resolve the problem, especially considering the 
importance that the OIG has placed upon the words “medically 
necessary” in previous decisions.218 
E. The Hospital Fair Competition Act of 2005 
In 2005, Senator Charles Grassley and twenty-three co-sponsors 
introduced a bill in the Senate that would have explicitly made 
gainsharing programs legal.219  S.1002, titled the Hospital Fair 
Competition Act of 2005, would have created exemptions to the CMP 
Statute, the federal AKS, and the Stark Law for “arrangements 
between hospitals or critical access hospitals and physicians in which 
physicians share in the savings experienced by the hospital or critical 
access hospital by reason of cost-reduction efforts that involve the 
physicians.”220  The bill also authorized the Secretary of Department 
of HHS to establish requirements for the programs to ensure that the 
shared-savings arrangements did not pose a risk to patient care and 
that “financial incentives that could affect physician referrals [would 
be] minimized.”221  The bill expired at the end of the session.222  The 
record as to the bill is very limited, but it is possible that the Hospital 
Fair Competition Act did not progress in the Senate due to concerns 
about a provision that would have extended the Stark Law’s 
prohibition on physician-owned hospitals and changes to the way that 
hospitals would be paid.223 
 
 216  Saver, supra note 3, at 164–65. 
 217  Claiborne et al., supra note 7 at 491.   
 218  Id.   
 219  Hospital Fair Competition Act, S. 1002, 109th Cong. § 4 (2005); see Appendix 
A for § 4 of the Hospital Fair Competition Act of 2005.   
 220  Id. 
 221  Id. 
 222  Id. 
 223  See, e.g., Proposed Self-Referral Ban Casts Chill on Specialty Hospitals, MCDERMOTT 
WILL & EMERY (May 18, 2005), 
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F. Outlier Laws 
Saver suggested minimal regulation via outlier laws, which would 
“identify only the most problematic practices, leaving other forms of 
gainsharing unregulated.”224  Other problematic forms of gainsharing 
that were troublesome but not the most problematic would be 
discouraged by “publicity, market pressures, physicians’ professional 
ethics, and tort deterrence,” rather than regulation.225  Such a law 
may encourage hospitals to adopt gainsharing programs and 
experiment with cost-saving measures.  Enacting such a law, however, 
would still leave hospitals with a great deal of uncertainty as to 
whether they risk violating the CMP, the AKS, or the Stark law, and 
whether they risk losing their tax-exempt status.  The outlier laws 
could provide an exemption for gainsharing programs.  In order to 
prevent fraud, the law would then have to define what qualifies as a 
gainsharing program.  This could mean restricting the freedom of 
hospitals, which is what adopting the outlier laws would strive to 
avoid.  An outlier law would be a promising possibility if it included 
minimal standards for what programs would qualify for exemptions 
of the problematic laws. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
If given the appropriate regulatory environment, gainsharing 
programs have the potential to reduce healthcare costs and increase 
efficiency without sacrificing the quality of healthcare.  A number of 
legal barriers have prevented such programs from taking hold 
because hospitals and other medical entities do not want to risk 
facing penalties.  Efforts to encourage, or at least accommodate, 
gainsharing programs have thus far been accomplished in a 
piecemeal manner, through pilot programs and advisory opinions. 
Although Congress enacted a large number of changes to 
healthcare via PPACA, it did not resolve the legal barriers to 
gainsharing in this legislation in a permanent way.  Although the OIG 
may continue to issue favorable advisory opinions, healthcare 
organizations will only be able to establish productive and permanent 
 
http://www.mwe.com/index.cfm/fuseaction/publications.nldetail/object_id/ 
e6710c2c-4070-4d10-b5f4-cea8c7a74d0d.cfm; Congress Holds Gainsharing Hearing, 
GREATER N.Y. HOSP. ASS’N, http://www.gnyha.org/902/Default.aspx?&print=yes 
(opposing changes to hospital payment methods but supporting the ban on 
physician-owned hospitals). 
 224  Saver, supra note 3, at 227–28. 
 225  Id. at 228.   
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gainsharing programs if Congress makes permanent amendments to 
the relevant statutes. 
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APPENDIX A 
THE HOSPITAL FAIR COMPETITION ACT OF 2005 
SEC. 4. PERMISSIBLE COORDINATED CARE INCENTIVE ARRANGEMENTS 
BETWEEN HOSPITALS AND PHYSICIANS 
(a) Establishment of Requirements for Arrangements and Exemption 
From Imposition of Civil Monetary Penalties- Section 1128A of the 
Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 1320a-7a) is amended by adding at the 
end the following new subsection: 
 o. Arrangements Between Hospitals and Physicians- 
(1) IN GENERAL - Subsection (b) shall not apply to an 
arrangement that meet the requirements under 
paragraph (2). 
 
(2) REQUIREMENTS - 
 (A) ESTABLISHMENT- The Secretary shall establish 
requirements for arrangements between hospitals or 
critical access hospitals and physicians in which 
physicians share in the savings experienced by the 
hospital or critical access hospital by reason of cost-
reduction efforts that involve the physicians. 
 
 (B) PROTECTIONS- In establishing the requirements 
under subparagraph  
     (A), the Secretary shall ensure that— 
(i) the quality of care provided to individuals is 
protected under the arrangement; and 
(ii)financial incentives that could affect physician 
referrals are minimized. 
 (C) MONITOR- The Secretary shall establish 
procedures to monitor arrangements described in 
subparagraph (A) to ensure that such agreements meet 
the requirements under such subparagraph. 
(b)Exemption From Criminal Penalties- Section 1128B(b)(3) of 
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the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 1320a-7b(b)(3)) is amended- 
(1) in subparagraph (G), by striking ‘and’ at the end; 
(2) in subparagraph (H), as added by section 237(d) of the 
Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act 
of 2003 (Public Law 108-173; 117 Stat. 2213)-- 
 (A)         by moving such subparagraph 2 ems to the left; and 
 (B)    by striking the period at the end and inserting a 
semicolon; 
(3) by redesignating subparagraph (H), as added by section 
431(a) of the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and  
Modernization Act of 2003 (Public Law 108-173; 117 Stat. 2287), as 
subparagraph (I); 
(4) in subparagraph (I), as so redesignated— 
 (A)    by moving such subparagraph 2 ems to the left; and 
 (B)   by striking the period at the end and inserting ‘; and’; 
and 
(5) by adding at the end of the following new subparagraph: 
 (J)    an arrangement that meets the requirements established 
under section 1128A(o). 
(b) Exemption From Limitation on Certain Physician Referrals- 
Section 1877(e) of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 1395nn(e)) 
is amended by adding at the end of the following new 
paragraph: 
(9) ARRANGEMENTS BETWEEN HOSPITALS AND 
PHYSICIANS- An arrangement that meets the requirements 
established under section 1128A(o). 
 
